Philosophy has been a fundamental part of the human society. Since time

immemorial, there have emerged formidable figures that have come up with
varied theories in an effort to explain different aspects touching on
the human society. Indeed, the theories created by these figures have
undergone considerable modifications, with numerous other philosophical
viewpoints emanating from the same, either in support of or opposing the
original viewpoints. It goes without saying that the varied
philosophical viewpoints have brought their crafters varying degrees of
fame. While the human society has produced varied popular philosophers,
one of the most popular philosophers remains to be Emanuel Kant,
(1724–1804). This is especially with regard to his notion pertaining
to transcendental argument.
THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT
Kant conceived this kind of argument as starting with an uncontroversial
premise pertaining to individual’s knowledge, experience, or thought,
before going ahead and reasoning to an unobvious and substantive
necessary condition for the premise. This reasoning aims at being priori
in one way, either relaxed or strict. In most cases, the conclusion
pertaining to the argument is directed against some type of skepticism.
Indeed, targets of the transcendental arguments that Kant put across
include skepticism pertaining to the applicability of concepts that do
not emanate from experience to the world of experience, as well as
skepticism pertaining to the existence of objects that are external to
the human society in space.
The transcendental logic aimed at pointing out that predisposing most
of the daily experience the Transcendental analytic, which is the
underlying scheme. As a term, analytic, underlines something similar to
“taking apart”, which is essentially what Kant tries to accomplish
on the non-empirical component pertaining to the daily experience. The
transcendental deduction aims at solving the problem on how individuals
can determine the categories that they should apply to experience or
rather, how they can determine that experience has to conform to the
groups or categories. There exists no issue on the manner in which
empirical concepts (such as heavy or red) would be applied to
experience, especially considering that they emanate from experience, in
which case they must apply to it. Nevertheless, Kant opines that the
categories (such as causation and substance among others) are entirely
priori, that is they do not emanate from experience, rather they come
from the manner in which individual’s minds operate. The implication
of Kant’s assertions is that it would be difficult to think about the
world without using these concepts. They offer the type of thought in
something just in the same manner that time and space offer some form of
intuition. However, the fact that individuals have to use these concepts
so as to think at all does not come as a guarantee to the fact that
their experience will be such as to allow them to use them.
Transcendental deduction is essentially a justification of the
utilization of these concepts. Empirical concepts may have an empirical
justification, but the same cannot be said of priori concepts or
categories, in which case they would need transcendental deduction,
which is a justification pertaining to the necessary conditions for
having the experience in the first place.
The transcendental argument states that individual’s experience is
unified as a coherent whole rather than just a collection of varied
autonomous perceptions and ideas. Experience is not unified by anything
empirical in the experience itself, nor is it that every other
representation is an attribute or a feature of a thinking substance as
stated by Descartes. Instead, Kant states that experience is unified by
the fact that individuals think of their representations as being
theirs. In this regard, Kant states that it is possible for “I
think” to follow all of the individual’s representations. Kant asks
what would be necessary for individuals to have the capacity to think of
all their representations as being attributable to a single self. He
states that this would only be possible if individuals can also think of
their representations as being representations of an objective world
that exists beyond or outside them and is unique from their subjective
experiences pertaining to it.
This thought is based on the fact that individuals need to interpret
their mental states as representations pertaining to an external world
so as to make sense of them. For example, if an individual attempts to
imagine how an experience would be if they did not regard it as being
representative of an objective world. Attempts at subtracting the idea
that an individual’s experiences of colored shapes is, essentially, an
experience of a world that is outside the individual would make it hard
for an individual to make sense of the visual experiences if they did
not think of the experiences as being representative of an objective
thing. The third premise on which Kant’s theory is built revolves
around the fact that individuals can only think of their representations
as being theirs only in instances where they can also think of them as
being representative of an objective world. Kant opines that there
exists no way that individuals can ever get the idea pertaining to an
object from the sensation’s raw material. Indeed, if they did not
already have an idea pertaining to an object as to utilize it in the
organization of their experience, there exists no way in which they
could ever obtain it from their sensations’ play. This, in essence,
means that individuals could not obtain the concept of substance from
their experiences. This means that individuals can only think of their
representations as being representative of an objective world in
instances where they can utilize the object’s concept to organize
them. An object’s concept is, essentially, the provisions of the
categories. It would only be possible to have a unified experience in
instances where an individual applies the categories to the experience.
Metaphysical deductions
Kant, in the metaphysical deduction, aims at offering a principle that
would allow for the identification of the most basic or fundamental
concepts pertaining to thought, the categories pertaining to
comprehension, before showing that the knowledge that an individual has
for any object revolves around these categories. The argument is based
on the claim that knowledge will always be expressed in judgment. In
addition, he argues that there exist certain characteristic logical
functions or characteristic forms of judgment. The logical functions of
judgment have to offer the fundamental concepts for the conception of
objects for an individual’s judgment to revolve around the objects. In
essence, Kant first comes up with a table of logical functions of
judgment on the basis of the premise that every judgment incorporates
quality, modality, relation and quantity. He then goes ahead to come up
with a table of categories or groups under the four headings depicting
the manner in which objects pertaining to such judgments have to be
conceived. In this case, judgments can be singular, particular or
universal, while there objects have to be totalities, pluralities or
unities. Judgments can be infinite, negative or affirmative, while
objects are manifestations of limitation, negation or reality. Judgments
can relate a single predicate-subject judgment to another as consequent
and antecedent (a hypothetical judgment), or a predicate to a subject
(which is a categorical judgment), or even as alternatives (or rather a
disjunctive judgment). Correspondingly, objects may manifest or show the
relations of community or reciprocity, causality and dependence, or
inherence and subsistence. Lastly, judgments can be apodeictic,
assertoric, or problematic, in which case their objects would either be
existent or non-existent, possible or impossible, and necessary or
contingent.
Schematicism
From the transcendental deductions, it was evident that the only way in
which individuals can obtain objects so through the alteration of their
sensibility. In addition, it was evident that pure priori concepts must
a priori incorporate formal conditions for sensibilities besides the
function of the comprehension in the group itself. These are conditions
that incorporate general conditions for sensibility to which the
comprehension concept is restricted in its utilization, the concept’s
schema. In itself, schema is only produced by imagination. As a
synthesis of imagination, however, it is not intended to be
differentiated from the image. For instance, if an individual was to
place five points consecutively, they would make an image of number
five. On the other hand, if the individual was to think of any number in
general, the thought would be representing a technique for representing
a multitude in an image in line with certain concepts other than the
image. The representation of the imaginations procedure through which a
concept obtains its image is the concept’s schema. On the contrary, a
comprehension’s pure concept’s schema is something that cannot be
brought to any image whatsoever as it is the pure synthesis that is
determined through the rule of unity in line with the concepts in
general. It, essentially, is an imagination’s transcendental product,
a product that is concerned with the determination of the inner sense in
line with the conditions pertaining to its form and with respect every
representation insofar as the representations would be connected a
priori in a single concept in line with the apperception’s unity.
Kant’s Refutation of Idealism
Kant, in the Refutation of Idealism, is not targeting Humean skepticism
pertaining to how applicable priori concepts are rather he targets
Cartesian skepticism pertaining to the external world. Kant, more
specifically, aimed at refuting “problematic idealism”, which
underlined the notion that it is doubtful and indemonstrable that there
exists objects outside us in space. In this regard, he claims that such
objects would exist from an individual’s awareness as to the fact that
his representations incorporate a specific temporal order. Presently, an
individual would be aware of the specific temporal order pertaining to
the numerous experiences o his past, an awareness that emanates from his
memory. Kant poses the question on the things pertaining to what an
individual remembers that allows him to come up with a temporal order
pertaining to his experiences. He states that there must exist something
that an individual refers to and correlates the experiences that he
remembers thereby allowing him to determine the experience’s temporal
order. First, however, the individual would incorporate no conscious
state that has the capacity to undertake this role. In addition, the
reference would never be time itself, as time is not perceived by
itself. Some philosophers have underlined the notion that the content of
memories pertaining to individual events are not indexed to certain
times as is the case for videotapes and sportscasts. Kant, on the other
hand, contends that this reference would only be something beyond or
outside the individual in space, and it has to be something that is
considerably permanent. The plausibility of this claim is reinforced by
the regularity or how often individuals determine the instances at which
their experiences take place. They make use of the observations
pertaining to the position of the sun or even a clock that shows time
through the period of the pendulum or rather through the period
pertaining to the cesium atom’s vibration. Indeed, the argument that
Kant puts forth takes advantage of this fact, as well as the observation
pertaining to the fact that there exists no similar periodic process in
the experience of human conscious that is considered autonomous of
spatial objects that it may represent, not to mention the fact that
individuals are deficient of any awareness pertaining to time by itself.
All these are aimed at showing that individuals must perceive objects
outside or beyond them in space by reference to which they can determine
or know their past experiences’ temporal order.
Like philosophers before and after him, Kant built his philosophies on
the workings of other previous philosophers. Indeed, he explored varied
philosophies and ideas that had been espoused in the past and sought to
criticize them or underline the mistakes pertaining to the same. This is
especially with regard to cosmological antinomies. As much as the four
metaphysical disputes presented by Kant in the “Antimony of Pure
Reason” are usually seen as direct conflict between sensibility and
reason, Kant sees them as disputes that that emanate from pure reason.
In fact, the two sides of the antimonies (called thesis and antithesis)
are a reflection of the varied forms of demands that reason makes for
unconditioned things. The things that conflict with restrictions
pertaining to sensibility are the assumptions that the demands produce
genuine disputes. Kant makes use of the contrast between the
“dynamical” and the “mathematical” to divide the four antimonies
into two categories, and uses two distinct ways to resolve the dispute.
The thesis of the fourth antimony states that there must exist a
necessary being that caused the entire sequence pertaining to the
contingent beings. This Being may either be the first member of the
whole sequence or be underlying it. The antithesis, on the other hand,
states that there exists no such Being whether outside or inside the
world. The necessity of the unconditioned and the metaphysical drive
find a natural resting place in the concept of God, who is an absolutely
necessary, as well as supremely real being. In the concept of God,
demands for completeness of knowledge and systematic unity obtain their
objective correlate. According to Kant, the idea of the Ideal defines
itself as a concept where an individual object that is entirely
determined via the mere idea. He sees the Ideal as a representation of
the highest singular manifestation of the demand of reason for the
unconditioned. Kant opined that the Ideal is founded on a natural rather
than a merely arbitrary idea.
Genesis of the ideas
This means that individuals are compelled to think of the idea of God in
instances where they pursue certain philosophical and speculative
interests. In essence, individuals are inevitably led to hold the idea
of God as they try to account for the possibility pertaining to things
in general. This underlines the fact that the idea of God is neither
easily dispensable nor arbitrary. Kant, instead, states that reason is
restricted philosophically to move in that direction in an effort to
provide an explanation for everything. These efforts necessitate
thinking the “All” or “totality” of reality, an idea that would
be necessary in efforts of individuals to thoroughly determine
everything through stating every possible predicate alongside their
contradictory. The process depends on the idea that the “collectivity
of everything predicates all things in general”. The idea pertaining
to “All of Reality” underlines an individual thing, leading people
to the representation of a supremely real being.
Kant sees a problem cropping up after the hypostatization of the “All
of reality”, and eventual personification of the same, which will
yield in the “Supreme Being”. He thinks that the idea would get
transmuted to the notion pertaining to a given object thanks to a
distinctive subreption where individuals substitute for a principle only
meant to be employed empirically. The central idea in Kant’s argument
is the fact that, just as the idea pertaining to the soul revolves
around the subreption of hypostatized consciousness, in which case the
idea pertaining to the Ideal emanates though hypostatization and
subrepted principle. Just as is the case for rational cosmology and
rational psychology, one key problem revolves around the assumption that
speculative or pure reasons produce any access to transcendent object
(God) about which individuals have to look for a priori knowledge.
Correcting the ills of pure reason
While Kant underlined the idea of God as inescapable and indispensable,
he denies that individuals have the capacity to gain any theoretical
knowledge pertaining to the object that is thought via such an idea.
Kant states that the idea of God must not lead individuals to assume
that there existed a being that matches the ideal. He states that
individuals are motivated to represent or come up with the idea so as to
satisfy their demand for the unconditioned.
Bibliography
Ameriks, Karl. 1999. Kant`s theory of mind: an analysis of the
paralogisms of pure reason. Oxford: Clarendon. 37-87
Kitcher, Patricia. 2011. Kant`s thinker. New York: Oxford University
Press. 33-59
Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J. Gregor. 2006. Practical philosophy.
Cambridge [u. a.]: Cambridge University Press. 45-69
Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J. Gregor. 2006. Practical philosophy.
Cambridge [u. a.]: Cambridge University Press. 45-69
Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J. Gregor. 2006. Practical philosophy.
Cambridge [u. a.]: Cambridge University Press. 45-69
Ameriks, Karl. 1999. Kant`s theory of mind: an analysis of the
paralogisms of pure reason. Oxford: Clarendon. 37-87
Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J. Gregor. 2006. Practical philosophy.
Cambridge [u. a.]: Cambridge University Press. 45-69
Ameriks, Karl. 1999. Kant`s theory of mind: an analysis of the
paralogisms of pure reason. Oxford: Clarendon.
Ameriks, Karl. 1999. Kant`s theory of mind: an analysis of the
paralogisms of pure reason. Oxford: Clarendon. 37-87
Kitcher, Patricia. 2011. Kant`s thinker. New York: Oxford University
Press. 33-59
Ameriks, Karl. 1999. Kant`s theory of mind: an analysis of the
paralogisms of pure reason. Oxford: Clarendon. 37-87
Kitcher, Patricia. 2011. Kant`s thinker. New York: Oxford University
Press. 33-59
Kitcher, Patricia. 2011. Kant`s thinker. New York: Oxford University
Press. 33-59
Kitcher, Patricia. 2011. Kant`s thinker. New York: Oxford University
Press. 33-59

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