INTELLIGENCE First and Last Name

Class
Question 1.Compare/contrast the roles and responsibilities of the former
position of DCI (prior to post 9/11 changes) and the current position of
the DNI. Be sure to be specific on such items as tasking, funding, and
DCI/DNI relationships with other members of the IC, the Administration
and Congress.
The US government is one of the main consumers of intelligence
information emanating from the intelligence Community, and it uses this
intelligence to advance and fully comprehend the impacts of its national
security decision. Intelligence plays a huge role in shaping military
activities, national and foreign policy decisions and relations with
other states. Intelligence is also crucial in ensuring homeland
security. Before the passage of legislation that created the institution
of the Director of National Intelligence, the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) had a long array of duties and responsibilities.
The DCI was tasked with the function of identify priority for analysis
and scrutiny by agencies of the national intelligence, and to supervise
the preparation of the national budget before presenting it to the
president. The DCI would also establish priorities for each agency and
the entire Intelligence Community, and delegate the task of performing
the task to the various inter-agency committees constituted by the
DCI, and that cut across the entire Community Management Intelligence.
The priorities established were to be passed through to the other
national agencies for action such as the National Geospatial Agency
(NGA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the National
Security Agency (NSA).
In cooperation with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
and all the heads of the relevant agencies, the Director of Central
Intelligence had the power to transfer funds and man power among the
NFIP. The DCI was also mandated with recommending prospective persons
for appointment by the Secretary of Defense to head of NGA, NRO and NSA.
Nonetheless the Secretary of Defense could recommend an individual to
the president for appointment, even if he or she did not concur with the
DCI, but was required to indicate that the DCI did not agree. Even
though the DCI had authority to develop annual budget fro the agency, he
had no power over the implementation of the budget, apart from that of
the CIA which he headed, also his authority of transfer of funds between
and among agency had to get approval of cabinet officers.
After the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 it became apparent that
the intelligence community was derisory and that the DCI lacked the
appropriate mechanism and organization to ensure that vital information
about the terrorists plot was disseminated to the analyst who had the
capability to identify the plot in advance before the attack. Before
the creation of the Office of the DNI, the DCI served as both the
director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and as the leader of
the Intelligence Community.
The National Commission on Terrorist Attack highlighted the limitation
of the DCI’s powers and control over the priorities and direction of
the Intelligence Community, particularly the elements in the Department
of Defense. Hitherto, the DCI could only direct such elements without
controlling them. The DCI never received any appropriation for the
activities of such elements and as such had little control over their
spending activities. The DCI also possessed little knowledge on how
elements within the department of Defense spent resources allocated to
them. Congress conscious of the gargantuan responsibility on the
shoulders of the DCI sought to strengthen his authority in 1996, by
creating the office of the assistant DCI who had the task of collection
analysis, production, and organization, and the office of the deputy DNI
who was tasked with the management of the community. Congress vision was
to ensure central control and organization of the Intelligence Community
but the limited authority of these two portfolios never helped to solve
the bureaucracy in the Intelligence Community.
The aforesaid limitations of the office of the DCI are what precipitated
the creation of the Director of National Intelligence through the
enactment of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. The
DNI would be the head of the intelligence community and would be a prime
intelligence adviser to the office of the president. He would also
supervise and direct the possession of key collection systems. The
institution of the DNI would have the effect of creating a center for
the enormous intelligence community. The DNI was mandated to ascertain
priorities for the funding by the federal government, oversee the
collection of crucial technical systems and requisite human personnel.
The 9/11 commission (National Commission on Terrorist Attack) had
exemplified the inadequacy of the Intelligence Community under the
supervision of the DCI. The commission raised concerns over the lack of
proper coordination of the National Intelligence which had hindered the
capability of the intelligence Community to gather and act on
information in the war against terrorism. It became apparent that the
DNI had to be accorded more authority especially in relation to the
budgeting for the acquisition of the collection systems, which was
hitherto managed by the agencies in the Defense portfolio. The DNI
directs and supervises the execution of the National Intelligence
Program manages the synchronization of foreign link between the
Intelligence Community and intelligence foreign elements, support
administrative and legal requirement and disseminates national
intelligence.
The DNI is responsible for the management of the whole Intelligence
Community and this included the CIA, the NGA, The NSA and the NRO. The
DNI has total control over the personnel and budgetary activities of the
entire Intelligence Community and the management of the IC is now more
centralized under him. The National Intelligence Director has also the
responsibility of approving and submitting to the president names of
individuals who should head the CIA, the NRO, the NSA, the DIA, the FBI,
the NGA and other intelligence agencies.
To assist the DNI in his administrative and coordination function, the
office of the deputy DNI was established. It was created as a division
of the National Counterterrorism Center with the task of preparing
government to counteract terrorism activities and scrutinizing
information on terrorist threat. The aim of the Act was to reshuffle the
Intelligence Community to present a better organized and coordinated
effort that could be more capable of counteracting terrorist activities.
The practice where the DCI combined function as both the head of the
Intelligence Community and CIA was termed as impractical because of the
immense responsibility left on his shoulders. As such the DNI was
prohibited from heading any other agency and the Act after 9/11 failed
to create the department of Intelligence that would have leveled the
other agencies under the authority of the DNI. Nonetheless the CIA would
be responsible to the DNI but would still continue performing its
foreign intelligence responsibilities and other covert mission as
mandated by the constitution.
The intelligence Reform and terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 equipped
the office of the DNI with crucial tools to bridge the gap between
domestic and foreign intelligence. He had more authority than his
predecessor (DCI) to set up security and technological standards for the
intelligence community information systems. The National
Counterterrorism Center would perform its function under the supervision
of the DNI and would serve as the key institution for the scrutiny of
foreign engineered terror threat and planning, disseminate information
and assign duties to the agencies and departments who would then proceed
to perform their mandated duties under their separate authorities.
Since the DNI would have no secret operations of his own, his role would
be to oversee the planning activities and budgets of the entire
Intelligence Community. In this new dispensation and reorganization of
the Intelligence structure, the DNI would supervise the community and
provide crucial strategic advice, while at the same time delegating the
operations to the relevant agency in the Intelligence Community
responsible for the implementation.
Question 2: Provide your own assessment (properly supported with
appropriate sources) as to whether you believe the DNI is fulfilling the
intent of the 911 Commission established the position, what issues still
exist in this position’s acceptance, and whether the Commission`s
directives made a difference or not.
The Intelligence Reform Act which integrated the recommendation of the
9/11 Commission, marked the end of the reign of DCI at the helm of
Intelligence Community and CIA and ushered in the position of the DNI
with more broad powers to coordinate the Intelligence Community efforts.
The 9/11 commission envisioned a more centralized and robust
Intelligence Community with the DNI at the helm. The office of the DNI
has initiated a number of initiatives primarily meant to eliminate the
gap between the 16 Intelligence agencies, which has increased
integration and information sharing. The technical barriers that
existed across the intelligence Community have been eliminated under the
leadership of one leader. The DNI unlike the DCI is not the head of the
CIA although the CIA is answerable to him.
The centralization of the Intelligence Community has smothered barriers
that had been highlighted by the 9/11 commission in the wake of the
terrorists attack. Some of the major initiatives that the office of the
DNI has spearheaded to eliminate information and cultural barriers
within the Intelligence Community, since passage of the Act include,
creation of collaborative mechanism and tools such as Library of
National Intelligence and Intelpedi.
Additionally, information sharing with domestic fusion hubs has been
promoted as a result of closer connection governed by the Department of
Homeland Security.
The combination of foreign and domestic intelligence by the Intelligence
Community has enabled it to avert and disable numerous terrorist threats
to the United States of America. The brisk technology transition in the
office of the DNI has enabled the Intelligence Community to capture many
terrorist bigwigs in Afghanistan and in Iraq. The office of the DNI now
briefs the president with intelligence emanating from all agencies and
that are more thoroughly analyzed. The office of the DNI has been able
to align the budget priorities of the entire Intelligence. Community and
align necessary resources to militate against the challenges posed by
terrorists.
Under the leadership of DNI, Intelligence Community has changed from a
bureaucratic system to a more open network of skilled experts and
analysts, who play their different role in their respective Intelligence
agencies, as one coherent body. The creation of the office of the DNI
has increased integration in the Intelligence Community where the
various agencies work with a common purpose. A fact sheet on the
achievement of the Intelligence Community under the supervision of the
DNI has revealed that, collaboration between and among the intelligence
agencies would have been impractical and impossible without the
existence of the office of the DNI. It has become possible to repeal
policies that hindered inter-agency cooperation and sharing of
information.
On the other hand the creation of the position of the DNI has been said
to have compounded the already complicated bureaucratic processes within
the Intelligence Community. The powers accorded to the DNI over budget
and operations of the immense Intelligence Community are not adequate to
cause major institutional changes in the Intelligence Community which is
dominated by the CIA. The DNI does not possess absolute control over the
personnel and expenditure.
Findings of the Presidential Intelligence Advisory Board revealed that
the office of the DNI has created unnecessary wrangles which have
resulted into wastage of energy and time which could be channeled toward
making The US a more secure place. The Recommendation of the board was
that the office of the DNI had too many personnel that needed to be
downsized. The main achievement of the DNI was the elimination of
barriers that existed in the collection and analysis that was so
prevalent in the old dispensation under the DCI and had that had
hindered the intelligent Community from preventing the terrorist attack
of 9/11. This has been possible through the creation of Intelligence
Community Executive Committee that ensures that there is total and
complete coverage of intelligence main concern and thus eradicating
overlap of functions. Nonetheless the lack of adequate knowledge on the
Iraq build up of weapon of mass destruction and the fresh threat by
terrorist all but highlight the inability the Intelligent Community
under the leadership of the DNI to analyze, disseminate and share
information.
. These impediments remain until now, despite the relentless attempt on
the part of DNI to drive and spirit of sharing information. The position
of DNI and the subsequent establishment .of DHS has been able to fuse
numerous organizations that were slackly connected with the Homeland
security issues before the attack in September 2001. Most notably, the
US has not been attacked since the creation of the position of the DNI s
the head of the National Intelligence has been able to stop terrorist
threats since the attack of September 2001. The level and degree of
process and technological process together with the organization
progress is reflected by the fact that there has not been any single
major terrorist attack. The DNI can arguably be said to have provided
the appropriate mechanism for ensuring an integrated Intelligence
Community. The level and extent of control is however based on the
faction of the DNI on the resources, both financial and human and
capability to counteract conflict and wrangles within the national
intelligence agencies.
The creation of an Information Sharing Environment (ISE) which is
headed by the DNI depicts another crucial milestone that the national
intelligence towards promoting sharing of homeland security and
terrorist information among different agencies. It has by far and large
extended the realms of the intelligence Community above what traditional
Intelligent Community could reach under the supervision of DCI.
Bibliography
Alfred, Cunning. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible
Policy Questions. Congressional Research Service. April 6, 2011
Intelligence Community Directive Number 200. Management, Integration,
and Oversight of Intelligence Community Analysis. 2007
Intelligence Community Directive Number 3. National Open Source
Enterprsie. July 11, 2006
Intelligence Community Directive Number 1. Policy Directive for
Intelligence Community Leadership. May 1, 2006
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America
Transformation through Integration and Innovation. Washington, DC.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005
Michael, Warner and Kenneth, McDonald.US Intelligence Community Reform
Studies Since 1947.Strategic Management Issues Office: Center for Study
of Intelligence, Washington, DC 2005
Richard, Best. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy
Questions Washington : Congressional Research Service, 2011.
Richard, Best and Andrew Feickert. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and
CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress, 2006.
Richard, Best. Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects
on DOD Intelligence Agencies. Congressional Research Service, 2004.
Intelligence Community Directive Number 3. National Open Source
Enterprise. July 11, 2006
Ibid
Warner, Michael and Kenneth, McDonald.US Intelligence Community Reform
Studies Since 1947.Strategic Management Issues Office: Center for Study
of Intelligence, Washington, DC 2005
Best, Richard. Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects
on DOD Intelligence Agencies. Congressional Research Service, 2004.
Integration and Innovation. Washington, DC. Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, 2005
Best, Richard. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible
Policy Questions. Washington : Congressional Research Service, 2011.
Warner & Kenneth (2005).
Richard, Best. Intelligence Community Reorganization: Potential Effects
on DOD Intelligence Agencies. Congressional Research Service, 2004.
Ibid
Best (2011).
Ibid
Cunning, Alfred. Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible
Policy Questions. Congressional Research Service. April 6, 2011
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America
Transformation through Integration and Innovation. Washington, DC.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2005
Cunning (2011).
Warner & Kenneth (2005).
Cunning (2011).
Best, Richard and Andrew Feickert. Special Operations Forces (SOF) and
CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress, 2006.
Best (2011).
Intelligence Community Directive Number 1. Policy Directive for
Intelligence Community Leadership. May 1, 2006
Warner & Kenneth (2005).
Intelligence Community Directive Number 200. Management, Integration,
and Oversight of Intelligence Community Analysis. 2007
The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America
Transformation through Integration and Innovation (2005).
Intelligence Community Directive Number 1. Policy Directive for
Intelligence Community Leadership (2006).
PAGE * MERGEFORMAT 1

Close Menu