IMMIGRATION REFORM Class

Background and current policy
Taiwan, formerly known as the Republic of China, is a significant player
in the entire world’s economy. Various nations have formalized their
relations by signing diplomatic agreements. As a matter of fact, Taiwan
has signed diplomatic agreements with twenty three countries including
the Vatican as at 2013. The United States has been transacting with
Taiwan since time immemorial. United States has had relations with
Taiwan on matters of security, political and economic interests.
Interestingly, United States does not recognize Taiwan diplomatically.
They have no formal diplomatic binding agreements.
US involvement with Taiwan
The United States has played critical roles in Taiwan’s political and
economic development. For instance, the United States through
congressional involvement pushed for Taiwan’s political liberalization
by ending the authoritarian dictatorship. These efforts saw Taiwan
transform into a dynamic democracy in which the citizens could defend
themselves from the military threats posed by People’s Republic of
China (PRC). This was a huge leap towards preserving international
peace.
The United States acknowledges the tension between Taiwan and People’s
Republic of China. Tactfully, the United States has neither recognized
PRC’s claim over Taiwan nor recognized Taiwan as a sovereign state.
The US policy considers Taiwan’s status as unsettled. The US supports
a peaceful process in the determination of the sovereignty of Taiwan in
future. Even when signing the three communiques with PRC in 1972, 1979
and 1982, the US was careful to acknowledge the positions of both PRC
and ROC concerning the Taiwan Strait.
The US policy takes a neutral position on Taiwan’s independence. It
leaves room for the two parties, to engage in a peaceful resolution
democratically and free of unilateral influences. Despite the numerous
official contacts between the United States and Taiwan including the
arms sales, the United States holds that their relationship with Taiwan
is ‘unofficial’. The relationship between Taiwan and the United
States has continued to grow in robustness and complexity especially
after Taiwan’s democratization and upholding values about freedom.
Despite holding on the neutrality claims, the United States in some
occasions acted in favor of Taiwan in Taiwan-PRC clashes. When PRC’s
People Liberation Army, test-fired missiles near Taiwan’s sea
provoking the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-1996, US President Clinton
aircraft carriers with battle groups near Taiwan. After Taiwan’s
successful democratic elections in 2000, President Clinton recognized
Taiwan’s democracy. He insisted that the resolution of the Taiwan-PRC
crisis must be with the assent of Taiwan’s people. President Bush in
2003 opposed any unilateral influence to change Taiwan’s Status quo.
In 2008 after the second successful democratic transfer of presidential
power, President Bush commended Taiwan referring to them as a beacon of
democracy.
The Taiwan Strait tension has been a matter of international security
especially with the potential intervention by the United States. It
involves the US-Taiwan relationship and US-PRC cooperation. It has
remained a matter of oversight by the US Congress involving a close
follow up of PRC-Taiwan negotiations. These negotiations have affected
trade and migration issues.
The Economic Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in 2008 has contributed
to reduced tension. The United States and other foreign firms are set to
benefit economically from the increased stability and direct flights.
However, there were complaints in 2010 during ECFA’s implementation
that Taiwan did not invest a lot of effort to resolve the beef import
issue. The United States Chamber of Commerce warned Taiwan of
over-reliance on a single market. The position was prompted, after
observing that over 40% of Taiwan’s exports went to PRC. Taiwan was
advised to pursue balanced relationships, as well as strengthen ties
with key stakeholders such as the United States for the sake of national
security.
Current US policy towards arms sales in Taiwan
Since 1979, US-Taiwan relations have been governed by the Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA). The TRA was passed to govern arms sales and still
exercises oversight on the policy. The act has several stipulations. The
first is the call on US to consider a threat to the security of the West
Pacific any non-peaceful means seeking to determine Taiwan’s future.
The second is the United States’ commitment to provide Taiwan with
weapons of a defensive character. The third urges the United States to
resist any urge to exert force or any form of coercion that could
jeopardize the social and economic security of Taiwan’s people.
The TRA outlines the role of the President and Congress in making
decisions on Taiwan security assistance. The American Institute in
Taiwan (AIT) was set up by the TRA in Taipei to continue with the
operations of the embassy. The AIT receives directions from the US
Department of State and Defense, and from the White House National
Security Council to implement policies. They also control notifications
to Congress concerning pending arms sales, as the Arms Export Control
Act requires.
In 2001, President George W. Bush promised to drop the annual arms talks
that had lasted for over twenty years. Instead, he favored normal
considerations of arms sales such as acting only on Taiwan’s requests.
These were efforts to normalize the US-Taiwan relationship. This saw the
US and Taiwan militaries beginning to work together in summer 2002 in
monitoring PLA’s Navy submarines. The same year, the first military
active-duty defense attaché, was sent to AIT.
The revision of policy in 2002 had implications on the US-Taiwan
relations especially related to senior-level exchanges. For the first
time since 1979, Taiwan’s Defense Minister was granted a visa to the
United States to attend a US-Taiwan Council conference. That made him
the first Defense Minister to travel to the United Stated on non-transit
purposes since 1979. In September, the same year, the deputy defense
minister travelled to the United States and was the first senior defense
official to have a meeting in the Pentagon since the 1979 fallout.
In 2008, concerns started rising concerning the stretching of China’s
objection over Taiwan arms sales. It appeared that the US policy that
had long served to assist Taiwan maintain its Air force capabilities
needed relooking. Arms sales still continued on the basis that
Taiwan’s defense needs were legitimate. This has introduced a fresh
quagmire to the Congress as to whether or not to disengage or increase
engagement with Taiwan.
The policy issues revolve around how the US has helped Taiwan in
self-defense, and whether these efforts have added to stability or
adjustments need to be done. Recent reports indicate China’s continued
deployment of cruise with ballistic missiles opposite Taiwan. It is a
matter that requires deep considerations to determine how the
heightening cross-strait dialogues are affecting the interests of the
US. The dilemma is whether the US should encourage or take an active
role in the cross-strait dialogues that involve confidence building
measures (CBMs). In 2009, the Deputy Secretary of State reported that
the Obama administration was encouraging Taiwan to explore confidence
building measures that would increase stability across the strait and
result in stronger ties.
Taiwan set up a new office of Defense Studies, and that also acts as a
preparatory office and think tank. This is to facilitate further
engagement of confidence building measures. Taiwan has expressed
commitment towards their self-defense and taking care of their defense
budget. Some US observers and officials have advised Taiwan civilian and
military leaders to place urgent priority on upgrading their
self-defense capability, as well as defense budget without foreign help
in mind. The Congress has continued to stress the need for Taiwan to
increase their defense budget but to their frustration, the 2013 defense
budget was set at 16.2%. That was a drop from the previous years’.
The Taiwan administration is committed to attaining independence on
self-defense and to increase their defense budget. They are also
committed to engaging amicably with China and other stakeholders
concerning the Taiwan Strait by enforcing the confidence. However,
Taiwan’s Quadrennial Defense Review released in March 2013 reported
that as much as progress has been recorded the optimal conditions for
CBM implementation have not yet matured.
There have been claims on hold-up and freezes on arms sales programs
since 2008. The Obama administration inherited that shaky relation and
has not managed to streamline the condition. There had been complaints
on delay in notifications to Congress. Such as was the case in September
2011 when three proposed programs were tabled on the same day.
This situation has necessitated a strategic policy review which presents
a number of options. One of the options is to revive the annual arms
sales talk. The second option is to amend President Bush’s policy of
2001 to consider Taiwan’s requests on a need-to basis. The arms sales
policy needs reassessment in light of a rising China and Taiwan’s
joint defense requirements. An annual strategic dialogue has been
suggested that would involve officials from US and Taiwan Departments of
Defense and State.
In 2009, the Chinese government sent a white paper to Obama’s
administration warning him of the impediment caused by the US military
sales to Taiwan on the China-US relationship. They warned him of
inheriting Washington’s continued violation of the three Joint
Communiques that were initially meant to govern these arms sales.
However, at the onset of his rule, President Obama had no option but to
oversee some of the sales that were pending as he continued to engage
the available options to end the tension.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee conducted a hearing on 4th October
2011 titled “Why Taiwan Matters”. Kurt Campbell, the assistant
Secretary of State informed the house that the United States was seeking
a strategic rebalancing of priorities to give focus in the Asia-Pacific
region. One of the key areas of concern stated was maintaining the
unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan. The second
was the amicable solution of the US-PRC tension.
Key questions came up that required deep engagement. Top among them
included cabinet-level official’s visits to Taiwan, senior Taiwan
officials visiting the United States and the US flag and general
military officers travelling to Taiwan. This migration questions
required engagement to determine which ones would be applied and to what
extent. Among other issues to be included in the policies proposed for
new US-Taiwan relations, immigration reforms would need to be given
consideration.
Despite the insistence of the US administration that their Taiwan
relations are important, Taiwan’s QDR termed Obama’s rebalancing
strategy as a challenge in their security environment. This shows that,
despite the existence of a policy guideline, the relations between US
and Taiwan are strained and require realignment.
In January 2013, the Taiwan Policy Act of 2013 was unveiled. The bill
sought to strengthen Taiwan’s defense by authorizing a number of arms
sales, and accepting Taiwan’s letter of requests for some fighters.
The TRA 2013 being the latest policy engagement also requires the
Departments of Defense and State to report to Congress any arms sales
and TRA implementation efforts.
Option number one: Reduce arms sales
A report released in September 2013 titled “Threading the needle:
Proposals for U.S and Chinese actions on Arms Sales to Taiwan”
suggests that it is possible for U.S to address the ailing Sino-U.S
relations without necessarily withdrawing completely from Taiwan. Facts
in the report point out the possibility of US to adhere to the TRA, the
six assurances and the three Joint Communiques and at the same time
reduce friction with China. Both parties have a role to play. The
U.S’s role is to recalibrate its annual arms sales to Taiwan to $942
million in weaponry. The second responsibility is to make sale
notifications to the Congress regular, predictable and subject to a
normalized schedule.
China’s responsibility is to express its commitment to a peaceful
resolution of the Taiwan issue. They would be required to withdraw and
dismantle the short-range ballistic missile brigade from Taiwan’s
inland. Beijing will also be required to be transparent in communicating
with Taiwan concerning arsenal transferred to Taiwan. The communication
needs to be verifiable, and the suggestion is that they do so by
communicating through authoritative publications such as white papers.
In reality, this is the option that the United States is exercising. In
August, this year, China expressed interest to hold talks with the
United States to get a lasting solution to the Taiwan issue. China’s
suggestion is that the United States stops selling arms to Taiwan. The
United States failed to approve that suggestion but agreed to have
talks. Before a new agreement is arrived at, the United States committed
to continuing with the sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan in adherence
to the TRA and the six assurances. These TRA, the Joint Communiques and
the six assurances all suggested a reduction in arms sales to defensive
weapons only.
Positive consequences
Any effort to reduce official effort with Taiwan is pleasant to China.
That means enhanced relations between the US and China. China has been
blaming the United States for their strained relationship. The reason is
that China insists a solution to end the cause of tension was proposed
in 1982, but the United States has continued to contravene it to date.
The August 17th Communique issued in 1982 had the United States promise
to reduce their sales to Taiwan gradually, as well as not engage a long
term policy on arms sales.
To the disappointment of China, for about three decades, the United
States has not made an effort to honor their part of the deal. This
means that a move to reduce arms sales to Taiwan would be highly welcome
by China. Once they see the United States’ willingness comply, they
may even initiate negotiations to reduce the friction that has been
between them for ages.
Negative consequences
Reduced arms sales would translate directly to reduced revenues derived
from the sale of weaponry. As a rational business entity, the United
States would not implement the reduction suggestion since unless there
are other factors that make the reduction strongly necessary.
Option number two: Eliminate arms sales
China is a key factor in this decision. Primarily, China considers
Taiwan their territory. Taiwan rejects such claims and insists on the
recognition of its sovereignty as an autonomous state. Though the United
States does not engage directly in Taiwan’s defense, the continued
supply with arms strengthens Taiwan’s defense and makes it difficult
for China to subdue them. This has enraged China for ages and is the
result of strained Sino-US relations since 1949.
China regards United States’ arms sales to Taiwan as interference in
China’s internal affairs. Evidently, neither the United State nor
China benefits from the strained relationship. China is clear on what
they want the United States to do. They want them to terminate the arms
sales to Taiwan completely. The positive side of this is that ceasing to
supply the arms does not mean the United States eliminate their
deterrence to China’s efforts to forcefully unify Taiwan with China.
In fact, terminating the arms sales appear to be a viable solution to
the Taiwan situation. This is because Taiwan will get an opportunity to
develop self-defense on their own and China will stop complaining of the
United States’ interference. The US Navy is enough to guard Taiwan
against invasion by Chinese militia.
In 2010, the United Stated Defense Secretary was denied permission by
the Chinese government to visit the People’s Republic China during his
visit to Asia. Deeply annoyed by the refusal, he expressed regret that
the U.S and China had not succeeded on building a sustainable
relationship of mutual trust. His assumption was that China acted so
solely because of U.S’s involvement in the Taiwan arms sale, as well
as that sales termination would be a quick healing balm to their
relationship.
China responded by acknowledging that US’s involvement in Taiwan was a
cause of their strained relationship, but their withdrawal would not
guarantee automatic reconciliation. This sent a message to the United
States that they needed to give more thought to their engagement with
Taiwan because the outcomes of the options at hand were not as plain as
they seemed to be.
Positive consequences
There is expected to be an improvement in the Sino-US relations. When
President Richard Nixon visited China in 1972, they held negotiations
for normalization of the relationship between China and the United
States. A key element in these negotiations was the Taiwan issue.
President Jimmy Carter oversaw the establishment of full diplomatic
relations with China in 1979. This agreement required American troops to
withdraw from Taiwan, and the treaties signed with Taiwan abrogated.
When President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act to law, the
Chinese government strongly opposed it.
These events bear witness to the fact the only lasting solution to the
ailing Sino-US relations is the termination of arms sales to Taiwan by
the US government. Such a move would support the United States claim of
supporting peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. It would create an
opportunity for US and China to work together in building strong power
relationship based on mutual benefit and equality. It would also enhance
credibility of the United States by demonstrating true abiding to the
three joint communiques that it has been criticized for not observing to
the letter.
A combination of the arms sales termination with a reiteration of the
United States’ commitment to defend Taiwan in case China attacks could
be the lasting solution to the Taiwan issue. Besides putting to rest the
Taiwan issue, it could also be an opportunity for the United States to
push their disarmament agenda in East Asia beginning with North Korea.
As long as they are supplying arms to Taiwan, they do not have the moral
authority to demand disarmament of other states.
Negative consequences
Though termination of arms sales does not imply giving up Taiwan, there
are chances that China may overthrow the Taiwan administration and
enforce the ‘One China’ policy they have always wanted. This would
render all the efforts the United States has put in shielding Taiwan
worthless. The US has helped Taiwan for all these years to fight against
the reunification of Taiwan with People’s Republic of China. By
supplying Taiwan with modern weapons, the US makes the cost of military
intervention for China very high. This has made it impossible for China
to overthrow China to date.
The effects of a possible reunification would be twofold. One face is
the downfall of the free market economy that already exists in Taiwan in
its autonomy. The United States might bear the greatest loss if that
happens. The reason is because Taiwan is a significant business partner
of the United States. As a matter of fact, a survey done in 2006
revealed that Taiwan is the eighth largest trading partner of the United
States. The United States has overseen the transformation of Taiwan from
a military state to a democracy and all these efforts are not allowing
then go down the drain.
The expectation that United States’ withdrawal from Taiwan and
termination of arms sales will result in a smooth end to the friction
between US and China may be mere utopia. Such action may not necessarily
achieve the perceived good relations that are anticipated by the United
States especially. Contrary, withdrawal and termination of arms sales to
Taiwan may act to fuel China’s aggressiveness.
It is obvious that Taiwan would be left at a point of vulnerability
making it easy for China to conquer their territory. Upon conquering
Taiwan, China may pride in their success and gain confidence to push
further. The result would be pushing for the conquest of the Sekanku
islands in contention with Japan and the border conflict with India.
Withdrawal of the United States is very likely to massage China’s ego
and cause friction in new dimensions.
Option number three: Increase arms sales
Chinese threats by modernizing their military serve to a good extent as
a provocation to the United States to approve increased arms sales to
Taiwan. The reason is that military power sometimes serves, as a display
of muscle to intimidate the other. When China makes an effort to show
the United States that they have military power, the United States
furnishes Taiwan with additional and modernized weaponry to outdo China.
It is highly unlikely that the United States arms sales to Taiwan will
stop any time soon. As it were, the United States claiming adherence to
the TRA is planning to provide Taiwan with a new round of state of the
art weapons between 2013 and 2015. These weapons range from F-16 C/D
fighters, Black Hawk utility helicopters, Patriot Advanced missile
batteries and Apache attack helicopters. This round of weapons will cost
up to $10 billion. President Obama is the first president to approve two
arm sales to Taiwan.
Positive consequences
The United States is rational even in its undertaking to support Taiwan.
There are economic benefits that would support the continuation of the
arms sales to Taiwan and even increase. One is the direct gain from the
arms sales. The United States delivers revenues from manufacturing,
assembling and selling arsenal. Second benefit is the economic relations
that have continued to thrive between the United States and Taiwan. For
as long as Taiwan remains independent, the United States is assured of
the business partnership that makes up a significant fraction of the
United States business partnerships.
A possible scenario is that if the United States increased their arms
sales to Taiwan, instead of standing out as the sole offender, other
countries may join in and do the same thing. The United States is not
the sole supplier of arms to in the world. Israel is China’s chief
supplier of cutting-edge military equipment and technology. Germany and
France were at some point supplying Taiwan with equipment, but they have
since stopped. If the increase results in a similar reaction by all
potential weapon suppliers to willing buyers, the United States,
continues to reap the massive profits of the arms sales without
portraying the bad guy image.
China has been on a military modernization process over the years. It is
probably making an effort to keep up outdo Taiwan, and once it is clear
to Taiwan that Chinese military ability is above theirs, China coerces
them to unification. The United States increase on arms sale will be
seeking to enhance Taiwan’s self-defense as well as put them at an
equal footing with China on the negotiation table.
While China continues to purchase strong weapons from Israel, it is only
fair that Taiwan also gets quality arsenal for two reasons. One is that
in case China decides to go the military violence way Taiwan will be
armed to defend itself. Secondly, even if the two decide to solve the
tension by peaceful negotiations, Taiwan will not be moved, by China’s
military superiority to give in to unification woos.
Negative consequences
Continuation of the arms sales to Taiwan creates the possibility of
military confrontation in the West Pacific fueled by China. As much as
it US weaponry supplies handicap China’s use of military force over
Taiwan it induces China to make military advancements at the same time.
China pursues these advancements in order to maintain their credibility
in the battle field and prove they are a real threat that should make
the United States consider dialogue.
This competitive military furnishing would serve only to heighten the
fear and mutual hostility between China and the United State. This gets
to a point where it is ceases to be a Taiwan tangle but an arms race.
First, the United States already lost China as a market for arms since
their insistence to continue supplying Taiwan with arms.
Analysis of the situation at the international security level confirmed
that the arms race may instigate conflicts that could result in war,
especially if the two parties are risk-acceptant. Such seems to be the
case between the United States and China. No one has shown any
indication to bow to the other. If this arms race continues, tension in
the Taiwan Strait will only increase and ultimately a war breaks out
between U.S and China.
Another possible danger of increasing the arms sale is a possible United
States entrapment in future. There may come a time when the modernly
furnished Taiwan military may decide to pursue an aggressive foreign
policy. Overtime, they have gained confidence in their military ability
that has been enhanced by the state of the art weaponry provided by the
United States. In the event that they seek independence aggressively,
China has made it clear that they will retaliate using military force.
Here, the United State would be in catch 22 situation because they would
unwillingly but inevitably drawn into the war in defense of Taiwan.
Conclusion
Various credible international policy scholars have proposed solutions
that can be applied to solve the Taiwan tension. Suggestions include
breaking down large arms into small pieces. The problem with this
suggestion is that China would not be fooled by such a tactic. Another
suggestion is a gradual reduction of United States direct involvement in
Taiwan defense affairs. That was suggested way back in 1982, but the
United States has shown little commitment to it. There would be no way
to convince China that the United States is now ready to stick to the
Joint Communiques. Another suggestion is to ask China to write off
United States’ debt as a tradeoff to suspend arms sales. Even a
suggestion promoting Taiwan’s Finlandization has been made!
Some of these suggestions sound ridiculous, but they all are suggesting
something. China’s say in all these suggestions sounds strong. That
tells the United States that times have changed. It is no longer
optional for them to review the TRA as soon as possible. Also, it
appears that the easy means that had been suggested in the communiques
and the assurances are no longer applicable. There is a need for a think
tank to analyze the situation and come up with an innovative policy that
will be favorable to the United States, acceptable to China and safe for
Taiwan.
From an analysis of the three options, the policy that appears to be
most promising is one that features termination of arms sales. Though
termination alone is not enough, unless careful consideration is made on
which other strategic tactics to employ alongside ceasing arms supply,
the Taiwan problem will be solved once and for all. The recommended
policy would be to terminate the annual arms sales to Taiwan and issue a
stern warning to China.
The warning would bear the commitment to stop interference with China
and Taiwan issues, but in the event that China initiates any military
aggression forcing Taiwan into reunite, the United States will act in
defense of Taiwan. The United States needs a knot to hold onto in this
deal. They can insist on keeping the US Navy on observership at an
agreed diameter in Taiwan’s inland.
There are several factors that make such a policy viable. The first key
factor is that, for its own benefit, China may not be eyeing a quick
overthrow of Taiwan. Currently, the largest investor in China is Taiwan.
Realistically, China would not blindly crumble Taiwan’s economy for
the sake of reunification and lose on the economic benefits they are
deriving from its autonomy. China and Taiwan have made great diplomatic
progress through the Three Links program and the Economic Cooperation
Framework Agreement (ECFA). This two have increased the interconnection
between China and Taiwan and narrowed down the chances of armed
conflict.
The current climate between People’s Republic of China and Taiwan
suggest little intent of China to exert military aggression or even
coercion towards Taiwan. This means that even Taiwan’s desperate
reliance on arms has reduced substantially. China and Taiwan’s
economic and diplomatic overtures have continued to become successful
with time making it highly unlikely that China would exert a military
unification. Then, the interdependence will only have become stronger.
This leaves the United States at a point where action is mandatory. This
is the opportune moment that the Obama administration should seize to
end this tension at the lowest possible cost and for the benefit of all
stakeholders.
Such a policy would have been difficult to implement during President
Chen Shui-bian who was pro-independence and used to engage in
provocative speech and actions towards Beijing. The current President Ma
Ying-jeou is pragmatic and takes a conciliatory position concerning the
mainland issue. His purchase of arms has not been for Chinese attack but
to secure domestic political stability. This shows his openness to a
suggestion that would enhance the credibility of his pro-peace system of
governance. He acts as the rich soil where the United State should
implement this policy, end the arms sales and take a strategic advisor
role to Taiwan.
Positive consequences
By ending the arms sales, the United States will not have compromised on
any of its strategic aims in Taiwan. It is an opportunity to eliminate
all the possible negative consequences such as entrapment and the
tension between U.S and China. As a matter of fact, this is the only
strategy that gives the U.S freedom to maneuver East Asia diplomatically
without questions of double standards.
A natural cooperation with China is one of the fantastic possibilities.
China would remove their focus from Taiwan and redirect it to other
places that need such attention such as Korea. This would be helpful to
the United States since it has long wanted to exercise disarmament on
North Korea but was gagged by its arms sales to Taiwan. The most likely
response to this is that China will tighten its policy with North Korea
such that even the other regional allies will placate. It is only in
this situation that the United States can visualize collaboration with
China to enforce its counter-proliferation aims to states such as Iran
and North Korea.
The economic growth of China and the consequent power is a fact that the
United States needs to catch up with. No smart economy wants to be at
loggerheads with an economy that has command internationally. Withdrawal
from Taiwan will act as appeasement to China and possibly accelerate
amicable resolving of the Sino-US conflicts. There is much that the two
states can do together especially because there are a lot of common
interests they share over and above promoting peace in Asia.
Any effort that could be made to prevent China from becoming a hostile
power is a move worth making. Such is the opportunity ceasing arms sales
presents. The insistence of the United State to support Taiwan,
physically is a constant irritant to China. Its response to it is to the
situation has been to flex its military muscle waiting for the slightest
provocation to prove its point. Turning this aggression into meaningful
passion is the opportunity that the United States should not allow to
get wasted. Any effort to solve the issue though military action, is out
rightly a lose-lose-lose situation for China, United States and Taiwan.
This is the reason an understanding of the scope available to exercise
creativity and knowledge of what cannot be changed will be important in
guiding the implementation of this policy.
Negative consequences
It is obvious that termination of the arms sales to Taiwan would have
adverse effects on the economy of the United States. The U.S companies
such as Raytheon and Lockheed Martins that manufacture, assemble and
deliver arms reap huge profits from the sales. An abrupt termination of
the Taiwan sales would mean that they need to reduce their production
significantly. That is not good news in the current state of the
economy. It not only affects the companies involved but the entire
economy. This will be felt through the reduced earnings from exports. At
a lower level, the companies may even have to retrench employees due to
the reduced levels of production.
People’s Republic of China has entered various agreements with Taiwan
especially between 2008 and now but little progress seems to have been
made in resolving their differences. For instance, after seven rounds of
discussions in 2011 concerning banking regulation, the two could still
not agree they just managed a consensus on industrial cooperation.
People’s Republic of China is taking advantage of the lack of an
agreement on taxation to propose taxing Taiwan’s income from stock
trading. Taiwan is facing major challenges in protecting its citizens
from detention in People’s Republic of China.
Beyond what is favorable to the United States alone, there comes a time
when the route to take is the one that leads to the greater good. This
means that one party in this threefold conflict involving People’s
Republic of China, the United States and Taiwan will have to for the
benefit of them all. The United States seems like the best placed to act
and in a way that does not spell personal gain as the incentive. This
policy may just be the solution Taiwan has been badly wanting all these
years.
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Koehn, Peter H. 1999. The outlook for US-China relations following the
1997 – 1998 summits: Chinese and American perspectives on security,
trade, and cultural exchange. Hong Kong: Chinese Univ. Press.
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Taiwan relations: twenty years after the Taiwan relations act.
Baltimore, MD.: University of Maryland School of Law.
Zagoria, Donald S. 2003. Breaking the China-Taiwan impasse. Westport,
Conn. [u.a.]: Praeger.
Feffer, John. 2010. Power Trip Unilateralism and Global Strategy after
September 11. New York: Seven Stories Press. HYPERLINK
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Diplomacy and International Relations. Scotland UK. Palgrave Macmillan.
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Diplomacy and International Relations. Scotland UK. Palgrave Macmillan.
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Li, Thian-hok. 2010. America`s security and Taiwan`s freedom: speeches
and essays. [Philadelphia]: Xlibris Corp.
Feffer, John. 2010. Power Trip Unilateralism and Global Strategy after
September 11. New York: Seven Stories Press. HYPERLINK
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September 11. New York: Seven Stories Press. HYPERLINK
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http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=544610 .
Lan, Caifeng, and David Decker. 1997. China (the mainland and Taiwan)
in transition: selected essays. Indianapolis, IN: University of
Indianapolis Press.
Vracken, V Dennis. 1986. U.S Arms Sales to Taiwan: Institutionalized
Ambiguity. Asian Survey 26, no.12. HYPERLINK
“http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2644550?uid=2&uid=4&sid=211029600
62823″
http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/2644550?uid=2&uid=4&sid=2110296006
2823
Feffer, John. 2010. Power Trip Unilateralism and Global Strategy after
September 11. New York: Seven Stories Press. HYPERLINK
“http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=544610”
http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=544610 .
Lan, Caifeng, and David Decker. 1997. China (the mainland and Taiwan)
in transition: selected essays. Indianapolis, IN: University of
Indianapolis Press.
Koehn, Peter H. 1999. The outlook for US-China relations following the
1997 – 1998 summits: Chinese and American perspectives on security,
trade, and cultural exchange. Hong Kong: Chinese Univ. Press.
Allen, Richard V. 1985. U.S.-Taiwan relations: economic and strategic
dimensions. San Francisco: The Institute.
Feffer, John. 2010. Power Trip Unilateralism and Global Strategy after
September 11. New York: Seven Stories Press. HYPERLINK
“http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=544610”
http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=544610 .
Allen, Richard V. 1985. U.S.-Taiwan relations: economic and strategic
dimensions. San Francisco: The Institute.
Swaine, Michael D. 2011. America`s challenge: engaging a rising China
in the twenty-first century. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace.
Ross, Robert S. 1994. Negotiating cooperation: the United States and
China, 1969-1989.
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