America’s Combatant Policy on Terror

The Bush administration in September, 2011, resorted to detention of
individuals suspected of being either agents or members of the al Qaeda
as enemy combatants and held them to facilitate interrogation. This
armed conflict employed treats terrorists as combatants. The government
holds that it can detain terrorists till hostilities end, despite lack
of a foreseeable end scenario to the war on terror. Labeling persons as
foe combatants and holding them for charges of war on terror that might
never conclude, raises grim policy and legal concerns. Subsequent to
9/11 the U.S. government established that the Geneva Conventions do not
pertain to the clash with the al Qaeda. Thus all al Qaeda operatives
were by design unlawful war prisoners and were subject to interrogation,
to gain intelligence knowledge concerning the enemy’s military plans.
As said by John Yoo, the deputy attorney general in the Bush
administration, information is the fundamental bludgeon in the conflict
in opposition to this new breed of enemy, and intelligence acquired from
suspected terrorists is the most efficient way of preventing future
terror attacks upon the United States (Silkenat, 2007).
Assume there exists a call for protective detention as an instrument in
war against terror, and assuming a system can be crafted that is legal.
There remains the fundamental question of a resonant policy: to what
point can the government create a method of protective detention that is
seen as fair, applied in consistency and is customized to meet up its
objectives (Silkenat, pg 67).
A major negative ramification to the combatant policy on enemies is that
other independent countries may be undecided to cooperate with the U.S
in pursuing terror suspects because of the displeasure caused by the
U.S.’s preventive detention policies. Not to my surprise, the foe
combatant policy has triggered criticism from various individuals
transversely in the political field (Berkotwitz, 2005).
References
Silkenat, J. R., & Shulman, M. R. (2007). The imperial presidency and
the consequences of 9/11: Lawyers react to the global war on terrorism.
Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.
Berkowitz, P. (2005). Terrorism, the laws of war, and the Constitution:
Debating the enemy combatant cases. Stanford, Calif: Hoover Institution
Press.
AMERICA’S TERROR POLICY PAGE * MERGEFORMAT 4
AMERICA’S TERROR POLICY 1

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